



Paradoxos: Dedutivos, Indutivos e Práticos

Sergi Oms (University of Barcelona) *Semantic Epistemicism* - Authors like Armour-Garb, Beall and Restall have made explicit what should be the stance of Horwich's Minimalism on The Liar. They call this position, which takes The Liar to be indeterminate, 'Semantic Epistemicism'. According to Semantic Epistemicism, The Liar sentence is indeterminate in the sense that, although it is either true or false, it is impossible to know, due to semantic reasons and the restriction of the T-schema, which truth value it has. Minimalism claims that the meaning of 'true' is given by our disposition to accept the instances of the T-schema. Now, since Minimalism faces The Liar by restricting the T-schema, there will not be any instance of such schema involving The Liar, which means that, within minimalist theory (which have as axioms instances of the T-schema), we will neither be able to prove that The Liar is true nor that it is false. The minimalist takes this fact to show that it is conceptually impossible to know that The Liar is true and it is conceptually impossible to know that The Liar is false. Nevertheless, since Minimalism is committed to classical logic and, hence, accepts the principle of bivalence, The Liar is, after all, either true or false. Restall, using some ideas from Gupta's revision theory, have defended the necessity of interpreting the instances of the T-schema as revision rules. I will put forward some objections to Semantic Epistemicism and I will argue that, at least some of them, can be met by Restall's proposal.

Elia Zardini (University of Aberdeen) *Truth without Contra(diction)* - The concept of *truth* arguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorising. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the *correspondence schema* "*P* is true iff *P*", is inconsistent in classical logic, as shown by the *semantic paradoxes*. I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the rule of *contraction* (if *C* follows from Γ, A, A , then *C* follows from Γ, A). The logic is otherwise surprisingly strong, allowing for example the validity of the traditional laws of *excluded middle* and of *non-contradiction*, and for the traditional constraint of *truth preservation*. This technically attractive solution is philosophically motivated by the view, underlying the absence of contraction in the logic, that paradoxical sentences are distinctively "*unstable*": once used in an inference, they are, as it were, lost and no longer available as fresh premises for other inferences. For example, given the correspondence schema, the assumption that the Liar sentence (i.e. 'This sentence is false') is true leads to its being false, but contradiction is avoided, as we have the conclusion only by using (and so losing) the premise, which is no longer available. Because of this instability, a *static* conception of paradoxical sentences as "*forever*" *being* either true or false gives place to a more *dynamic* conception of such sentences as "*forever*" *becoming* true from false and false from true.

José Martínez (University of Barcelona) *Negation and paradoxes in four-valued logic* - It is well-known that Belnap's logic can be used to give a consistent semantics to first-order self-referential languages. The aim of this paper is to present several classes of four-valued semantics that can be used to create paradox-free propositional languages. The semantics will be classified according to the types of negations present in them. I will also propose some open problems.

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Workshop on vagueness and self-reference

Lisboa — June 28th and 29th 2010

An initiative of the research project *Paradoxes: Deductive, Inductive, and Decision-Theoretic* (PTDC/FIL/67039/2006), based at the Institute of Philosophy of Language FCSH-UNL and at the University of Évora.

Location:

Institute of Philosophy of Language of the New University of Lisbon
Avenida de Berna 28, 1st floor, Lisboa
Room 1.04 of the ID Building

FIRST DAY June 28th (Monday)

- 09:00 – Welcome
- 09:30 – Rosanna Keefe (Sheffield): *Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?*
- 11:00 – Coffee
- 11:30 – Elia Zardini (Aberdeen): *Breaking the chains: following-from and transitivity*
- 13:00 – Lunch
- 14:30 – Ricardo Santos (Évora): *On the supervaluationist claim that a borderline bald cannot be bald*
- 16:00 – Coffee
- 16:30 – Øystein Linnebo (Bristol): *A partial defense of basic law V*
- 18:00 – Gonçalo Santos (Barcelona): *Fine's modal version of generality relativism*
- 19:30 – End of 1st day

SECOND DAY June 29th (Tuesday)

09:30 – Jordi Valor Abad (València): *Some remarks on the cassationist approach to the liar paradox*

11:00 – Coffee

11:30 – Sergi Oms (Barcelona): *Semantic epistemicism*

13:00 – Lunch

15:00 – Elia Zardini (Aberdeen): *Truth without contra(d)iction*

16:30 – Coffee

17:00 – José Martínez (Barcelona): *Negation and paradoxes in four-valued logic*

18:30 – End of 2nd day

Rosanna Keefe (University of Sheffield) *Modelling Vagueness: What can we ignore?* - A theory of vagueness gives a model of vague language and of reasoning within the language. Among the models that have been offered are Degree Theorists' numerical models that assign values between 0 and 1 to sentences, rather than simply modelling sentences as true or false. In this paper, I ask whether we can benefit from employing a rich, well-understood numerical framework, while ignoring those aspects of it that impute a level of mathematical precision that is not present in the modelled phenomenon of vagueness. Can we ignore apparent implications for the phenomena by pointing out that it is "just a model" and that the unwanted features are mere artefacts? I explore the distinction between representors and artefacts and the strategy of appealing to features as mere artefacts in defence of a theory. I focus largely on Degree Theories of Vagueness, but also consider the extent and role of artefacts within a supervaluationist theory.

Elia Zardini (University of Aberdeen) *Breaking the Chains: Following-from and Transitivity* - A major part of the philosophical investigation of the notion of logical consequence consists in an attempt at elucidating its nature—what consequence consists in. Yet, consequence is also a relation, and as such one can sensibly ask what its formal properties are. Arguably, Tarski's most notorious contribution to the philosophical investigation of the notion of consequence is constituted by his theory of what consequence consists in: truth preservation in every model. An at least equally important contribution to such investigation is however represented by his studies concerning an abstract theory of consequence relations, aimed at determining the formal behaviour of any such relation. In such studies, he mentions four properties a consequence relation worthy of any name must have: reflexivity, monotonicity, transitivity and (less centrally) compactness. I think all of these properties are at least questionable. But in the talk I will focus on transitivity (roughly, if A follows from Γ and C follows from Δ together with A , then C follows from Γ, Δ), trying to make adequate sense of a position according to which consequence is not transitive and assess what impact its correctness would have on our understanding of consequence. I have a particular investment in this issue, since I have proposed elsewhere a solution to the sorites paradox which consists in placing some principled restrictions on transitivity. To fix ideas, I will put on the table a range of philosophically interesting non-transitive consequence relations, introducing briefly their rationale. I will then discuss and dispose of two very influential objections of principle to the use of non-transitive consequence relations. On this basis, I will explore some fine details of the logical and normative structures generated by non-transitivity, and I will close by remarking on the peculiar local character exhibited by spaces of propositions whose entailment relations are not transitive.

Ricardo Santos (University of Évora) *On the supervaluationist claim that a borderline bald cannot be bald* - A central thesis of the standard supervaluationist theory of vagueness is that things cannot be a certain way without being definitely that way. I could not find any good argument in support of this thesis. What I think I have found, instead, is a certain inconsistency between this thesis, the semantics and logic proposed for the definitely operator, and the notion that a precisification is an admissible way of making a vague language precise. For, if two statements are logically incompatible, it surely should not be admissible to make the language precise in such a way that they turn out to be jointly true.

Øystein Linnebo (University of Bristol) *A partial defense of Basic Law V* - Frege's much maligned Basic Law V says that two concepts have the same extension just in case they are coextensive. This 'law' is almost universally rejected on the ground that Russell's paradox shows it to be inconsistent. In this paper I make some unconventional claims. First I claim that pressure remains to accept something like Basic Law V. Then I show how this pressure can be accommodated without inconsistency by adopting a richer logical framework than usual. Finally I outline how this controlled use of Basic Law V opens up new approaches to set theory and the logical paradoxes.

Gonçalo Santos (University of Barcelona) *Fine's modal version of generality relativism* - Timothy Williamson claims that the generality relativist holds a self-defeating thesis. In this talk we discuss Kit Fine's modal version of generality relativism, trying to see if it can resist this accusation.

Jordi Valor Abad (University of València) *Some remarks on the Cassationist approach to the Liar paradox* - The evaluation of any utterance of the sentence ' L is false', where the content of ' L ' is fixed by the stipulation: $L =_{df}$ ' L is false', gives rise to the liar paradox. By appealing to intuitive principles about truth—such as Tarski's schema—we can easily see that L is true if and only if L is false. Any assumption about the truth-value of L leads to a contradiction. The cassationist approach to the liar paradox uses this contradiction in order to offer a *reductio ad absurdum* of the idea that L can successfully be used to express propositions or advance statements which we can then evaluate as true or false. As it happens with any other alleged solution to the liar paradox, for the cassationist approach to be fully satisfactory it should ideally show three things: (a) that *it is not ad hoc*: it explains why our utterances of L fail to have content; (b) that *it is general enough*: it explains why different versions of the liar paradox—in particular, contingent liar paradoxes ('Cretans always speak falsely'), and paradoxes that involve indexicals in their formulation ('This is false')—are semantically defective; (c) that *it is free from paradoxes*: it does not generate paradoxes of its own. Lawrence Goldstein, and more recently Sven Rosenkranz and Arash Sarkohi, have defended the cassationist view on the grounds that stipulations such as that fixing the meaning of ' L ' or such as $S =_{df}$ ' S is not true'—which gives rise to the most popular version of the strengthened liar paradox—are defective. They also consider different versions of the liar paradox and other paradoxes of self-reference. In this presentation I will examine to what extent their proposals are free from paradoxes and will raise some questions as to how we are to understand the semantic defectiveness of the above stipulations and the meaning of the singular terms appearing in them: ' L ' and ' S '.